India and UK Expand Strategic Defence Cooperation Through Joint Development – Opinion
India and the United Kingdom are close to finalising two intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) covering the incorporation of Integrated Full Electric Propulsion (IFEP) systems on Indian Navy ships and the production of Martlet Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LLMs) in India. They are entering a new phase in their defence relationship. This represents establishing long-term defence industrial cooperation. Over the past few years, India and the UK have been strengthening the bilateral strategic partnership. This indicates that both are moving beyond conventional arms sales. The emerging relationship is progressively focused on technology, development and long-term strategic alignment.
In my view, this is a strategically important development for the countries, but its success will depend not only on the number of agreements signed but also on how much India and the UK convert political commitments into genuine technology partnerships. The most promising element of the relationship is the proposed cooperation on Integrated Full Electric Propulsion. For India, IFEP is not simply another acquisition program. It represents an opportunity to develop expertise in the technology of naval warfare. Electric propulsion can improve operational efficiency and reduce dependence on fossil fuels. It will provide greater flexibility in the design and operation of future warships.
India is planning to expand its naval fleet over the coming decade, in response to China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean Region. If IFEP proves successful, the technology could be incorporated into a much larger number of vessels. This is where British expertise becomes valuable. The Royal Navy has decades of experience with this, and India has an opportunity to accelerate its technological learning curve by working with an established partner rather than developing every component independently.
However, India must ensure that this cooperation does not become another traditional buyer-seller relationship. The strategic objective should be technology absorption, domestic manufacturing, intellectual-property access and the development of an Indian industrial ecosystem that should be capable of independently supporting and upgrading these systems. The same principle applies to the proposed production of LLMs. Local production can create value only if it goes beyond assembly. India has increasingly emphasised self-reliance in defence, but genuine self-reliance does not mean producing every system domestically from the beginning. It means gradually acquiring the technological, engineering and manufacturing capabilities necessary to design, develop, maintain and upgrade critical systems.
For India, the ideal outcome would be a partnership that maximises technological autonomy while maintaining strategic flexibility. India should avoid excessive dependence on any single foreign supplier. This principle is increasingly important because geopolitical competition is making defence supply chains more vulnerable. The wars and conflicts of recent years have demonstrated that access to ammunition, spare parts, maintenance facilities and critical technologies can be as important as the platforms themselves. A country that possesses sophisticated weapons but depends entirely on foreign suppliers for critical components remains strategically vulnerable.
Britain brings advanced technology, engineering expertise, established defence companies and access to Western defence networks. India brings scale, a growing defence-industrial ecosystem, a large domestic market and increasing demand for sophisticated military capabilities.
One of the major risks is India’s lengthy and complex procurement process. Projects that take years to move from approval to contract can lose technological momentum, increase costs and discourage foreign partners from making major investments. If the proposed IFEP cooperation is to become a long-term partnership, India must ensure that the procurement does not remain trapped in bureaucratic delays.
India’s approach should therefore remain pragmatic. It should cooperate with Britain where British capabilities provide clear strategic value, while maintaining parallel partnerships with France, the United States and other countries. Strategic autonomy in the contemporary international system is not about avoiding partnerships; it is about having enough partnerships to prevent excessive dependence on any single one.
For Britain, the relationship is equally significant. India represents one of the world’s fastest-growing defence markets and an increasingly influential Indo-Pacific power. Britain’s objective should not simply be to regain market share lost to France, Russia, Israel and the United States. It should establish itself as a long-term technology and industrial partner for India.
For Pakistan, this cooperation is the most subsequent component. The emerging India-UK defence relationship has the potential to become one of the more consequential bilateral defence partnerships. Whether it achieves that potential will depend on execution, technology transfer and institutional commitments as deterrence and strategic resilience in the region. While It is focused on building an indigenous industrial base rather than importing foreign tech and parts. This presents Pakistan with a difficult strategic equation. Nevertheless, Pakistan should avoid interpreting this agreement as an immediate threat requiring a direct procurement response. The more rational response would be to concentrate resources on areas that provide strategic returns like electronic warfare, unmanned systems, cyberspace and precision weapons. Pakistan’s most effective counterstrategy would be to prioritize quality over quantity, accelerate defense R&D, strengthen university-industry-military linkages and expand co-development arrangements with reliable partners. Maintaining credible deterrence will depend on technological resilience and industrial capacity rather than simply acquiring additional platforms.
