According to the 2023 and 2024 yearbooks of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the estimated inventory of India’s nuclear warheads increased from 164 in 2023 to 172 in 2024. According to the Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories 2025 estimated by the Federation of American Scientists, India had an estimated 180 nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2025.
That means that New Delhi added eight nuclear warheads per year between 2023 and 2025. According to the same two sources, Pakistan’s nuclear warheads inventory remained at 170 over the past two years. These estimates are demonstrative of India’s rapidly expanding nuclear weapons program, which is certainly the fastest-growing in nuclearized South Asia. Hitherto, Pakistan was always projected to possess a few nuclear warheads more than India.
The SIPRI reports also highlight a number of alarming trends concerning India’s nuclear posture, shift in policies on mating of nuclear warheads with launchers and no-first-use (NFU), and counterforce temptations.
First, India’s warhead stockpile is likely to continue to increase. Second, the placement of missiles in canisters and the conduct of sea-based deterrence patrols indicate that India may be moving toward mating some of its warheads with their launchers during peacetime. Third, India has been focusing on the development of “longer-range” missiles to enhance its capability to target states outside South Asia. Fourth, maintaining a portion of India’s nuclear arsenal at a higher state of readiness has raised concerns about New Delhi’s adherence to its No First Use (NFU) policy.
It has also prompted questions about whether India may be shifting toward a counterforce posture aimed at targeting an adversary’s nuclear weapons early in a crisis, even before they can be deployed. These threatening developments in nuclear posture and doctrines of a country that has evil designs on and jingoistic attitude towards its nuclear neighbors have serious implications for deterrence and strategic stability in the region and beyond.
India is clearly abusing the favors granted to it under the US 123 Agreement (civil nuclear deal) of 2007 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver of 2008 by either diverting imported nuclear materials from its eight unsafeguarded nuclear reactors for weapons program or using imported nuclear materials for peaceful uses and its own fissile material for the production of nuclear weapons.
In a bid to contain China, Western countries have showered India with strategic favors while turning a blind eye toward its fast-growing nuclear stockpile. 123 Agreement and NSG waiver practically removed all nuclear trade barriers for India. These agreements mainstreamed New Delhi into the international nuclear market without requiring it to become a Party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists report titled Estimating India’s Nuclear Weapons-producing Capacity assessed in 2018 that India could produce around 1,044 nuclear weapons if it decided to exploit its reactor-grade fissile material alongside military-grade plutonium production capabilities. The International Panel on Fissile Material noted that, in 2023, India possessed around 680 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium, which is enough to produce 130 to 210 nuclear warheads. Multiple reports by Harvard University’s Belfer Center have also pointed to the rapid expansion of India’s fissile material production. This unchecked expansion of fissile material poses a serious threat to regional and international peace and security.
Strategic capabilities are a function of fissile material stockpiles, as weapon-grade or weapon-usable fissile material is directly related to the number of warheads a nuclear country can produce. That is why existing asymmetries in fissile material stockpiles remain the major obstacle in the Conference on Disarmament to the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), which aims to halt future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. However, several countries, spearheaded by Pakistan, have been pressing for a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) that should also include existing fissile material stockpiles in its scope.
India’s unchecked nuclear expansion and shift in its nuclear force posture threaten regional power balance and strategic stability. With India’s longstanding unresolved territorial disputes and political tensions with nuclear neighbors, the potential for miscalculation or the likelihood of escalation during a crisis situation remains high, as was the case during the Balakot crisis of February 2019 and Indian attack on Pakistan in the aftermath of Pahalgam false flag operation.
India’s rejection of dialogue with Pakistan, weaponization of water, false flag operations, blame game, belligerency, state-sponsored international terrorism and Hindutva-driven extremism is a recipe for disaster in South Asia, which will also impact global stability. Enduring peace in South Asia is unlikely to be achieved without resolving the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, a potential nuclear flashpoint.
A nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan would have devastating consequences, both regionally and globally. A 2019 study titled “How an India-Pakistan Nuclear War Could Start—and Have Global Consequences,” published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, estimates that a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan could cause 50 to 125 million deaths within days, primarily due to blast effects, thermal radiation, and radioactive fallout. Major urban centers would become uninhabitable due to infrastructure collapse, radiation poisoning and widespread firestorms.
Critical systems such as healthcare, transportation and food distribution would break down. Environmental impact could include firestorms injecting 16–36 million tons of black carbon into the stratosphere, blocking 20–35% of sunlight. Rainfall could reduce by 15–30%, resulting in declining crop yields. The resulting mass starvation could affect up to two billion people globally. Nuclear winter conditions could persist for over a decade, prolonging ecological and economic devastation.
The specter of nuclear war looms large over the region due to India’s irresponsible behavior towards its nuclear neighbors, in particular Pakistan. The West therefore cannot afford to remain indifferent to New Delhi’s rapidly growing nuclear weapons program. The situation calls for measures that would potentially limit India’s ability to produce nuclear warheads, at the current rate of eight per year. Withdrawing NSG waiver granted to India or a collective decision by NSG member states to withhold provision of nuclear materials and technology to India could prove to be effective in achieving the desired objectives.
