Assessing the Role of Air Power in the 2025 India-Pakistan Standoff

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Silhouettes of two fighter jets fly across the backdrop of Indian and Pakistani flags, symbolizing military tension and air power dynamics.
Tensions in the Skies: India-Pakistan Air Power

Following ‘Operation Sindoor’—which likely became the largest aerial battle in modern warfare, with over a hundred fighters engaged simultaneously—an unusual dynamic emerged: neither side crossed the border. Instead, both forces relied on beyond-visual-range (BVR) weapons, striking Pakistani infrastructure from Indian airspace and targeting Indian aircraft from Pakistani territory.

Similarly, it seems like Pakistan launched air-to-air missiles toward more than one Indian fighters that conducted strikes on civilian infrastructure on the LOC and across the International Border. This aerial battle highlights several factors that may help understand modern aerial warfare.

Firstly, BVR is the future of air warfare. India reportedly used French-made SCALP EG cruise missiles and AASM Hammer Glide Bombs. Both missiles are Long Range Stand-off Weapon (LRSOW) systems, which, in the case of Pakistan and India, can be deployed from one’s territory to engage targets. In this case, it killed 31 civilians. Reportedly, Russians, in the Russia-Ukraine war, used FAB bombs fitted with Glide kits with much success.

Ukraine reported Russians hitting strategically important eastern and southern cities of Ukraine. These bombs are quiet and difficult to intercept. They can be launched from one’s territory especially when heavy air denial environment is expected over enemy air space. These missiles seemed more effective vis-à-vis traditional bombing campaign via their air platform in the past without losing any of their aerial platform.

Secondly, Pakistan reportedly used PL-15 missiles to intercept fighters across its border. The PL-15 is an active radar-guided, long-range, beyond-visual-range (BVR) air-to-air missile with an operational range of 145 km. Based on China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) doctrine, the missile appears to have also been effective for Pakistan in this standoff. IAF fighters were reportedly shot down over the Indian Territory, both along the LOC as well as across the International border on the Indian side. Several PL-15s were fired from Pakistani territory towards IAF fighters. This resulted in several kills, including French-made Rafales and Russian-made fighters. The result of air losses may compel India to think of other ways to “punish” Pakistan in the future.

The recent clash suggests that bigger is not always better. Relying on multiple fighters to overwhelm the enemy may not always be effective. Instead, the key lies in how well aerial platforms are employed and how effectively their capabilities are integrated. In this case, Pakistan appeared better prepared than India and made more effective use of its aerial platforms in terms of integration, deployment and execution.

The lack of open-source evidence indicating India’s use of air-to-air capabilities suggests its mission prioritized precision strikes over aerial engagements, focusing on evading Pakistan’s air defenses and missile systems. Alternatively, India may have underestimated the scale of Pakistan’s retaliatory response.

This aligns with the Indian External Affairs Minister’s claim that Pakistani authorities were preemptively notified about the strikes targeting alleged ‘terror infrastructure’—a factor that could explain India’s failure to fire air-to-air deployment, and the operational emphasis on cross-border standoff attacks. Another factor could be Pakistan employing superior electronic warfare and jamming systems, which could result in IAF fighters being unable to find PAF fighters, as well as disruption of communication with each other.

This claim could be reinforced by PAF’s Deputy Chief of Air Staff (Operations), AVM Aurangzeb, who presented intercepted audio during a press briefing—reportedly featuring the IAF call sign “Godzilla” unsuccessfully attempting to reach his squadmate.

One argument suggests that intelligent systems—not just firepower—will decide the battlefield. In this case, the PAF’s deployed an effective kill chains outperformed the IAF’s, leading to successful kills. The process works as follows: the target is ‘locked by A’ (i.e., detected by radars), ‘launched by B’ (i.e., fired by a fighter), and ‘guided by C’ (i.e., directed by AWACS to confirm the target). Due to this system configuration. Pakistan could accurately determine where the enemy fighters were downed. The Pakistan Air Force used this system seamlessly against the Indian Air Force.

This success was due to a concept called “network-centric warfare,” which refers to targeting and disrupting the enemy’s entire network rather than individual components. It worked for the PAF because of the proper integration of Chinese platforms with one another. In contrast, India operates three different types of fighter jets, which could potentially affect integration with other aerial platforms, as incompatible systems may hinder coordination.

A more recent example is the 2019 India-Pakistan standoff, in which during Pakistan’s operation, an Israeli-made Indian air defense system mistakenly shot down Indian Army’s Mi-17 helicopter. This is because during the Cold War, Soviet and Western equipment were opposing platforms designed to counter each other. India operates both types of systems, which may lack compatible Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems, making integration challenging.

In conclusion, the Indian Air Force (IAF) is likely to adopt a more calculated approach in future conflicts, shaped by the experiences and losses suffered during the 2019 as well as 2025 standoffs. Rather than deploying costly Fighters in high-risk battlefield, Indian military may turn to vast usage of drones and missile systems, which may offer more cost effective means of delivering strikes inside Pakistan while minimizing the risk to pilots as well as costly aerial platforms. These platforms could potentially be operated from safer distances and allow for precision targeting without directly engaging enemy air defenses.

Furthermore, the IAF is expected to acquire and develop long-range standoff weapons that may exceed the range of current systems such as the Scalp and Hammer missiles. This shift would enable India to conduct strikes without crossing the LoC or the International Border, which is evident from this stand-off battle. This in turn, according to India, would reduce the likelihood of escalation while maintaining operational effectiveness. This trend reflects a broader global shift toward unmanned and remote warfare such as in Ukraine-Russia war and Israel-Hamas conflict.

However, one cannot assume that manned fighter aircraft will become obsolete in the IAF’s strategy. Rather, their roles may be more reserved and integrated within a broader system that includes unmanned platforms and standoff weapons. The biggest challenge which IAF faced in this stand-off was integration of its aerial platform from opposing manufacture states. On the other hand, Pakistan may invest more in its Air defense and jamming platforms to intercept incoming drones and missiles.

This can include both short range air defense systems to intercept incoming drones and medium to long range air defense systems for LRSOW. Both India and Pakistan have historically adapted after each conflict, learning from operational shortcomings and refining their use of technology and tactics. It is likely that both India and Pakistan will follow this pattern along with West and China, analyzing past engagement and improving integration for more effective future engagement.

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