India’s May 1998 Pokhran-II nuclear tests, though hailed domestically as a bold assertion of strategic autonomy and nuclear prowess, undeniably triggered an instability in South Asia. In 1974, India openly defied the established nuclear non-proliferation treaty, effectively dismantling the fragile strategic balance in the region.
The tests provoked a swift nuclear response from Pakistan. Far from enhancing regional stability, India’s actions eroded the deterrence equilibrium and increased the risks in an already volatile security environment. India arguably undermined collective regional security and became the first state to introduce nuclear weapons in South Asia.
In the aftermath of India’s test, Pakistan conducted its first tests to reinstate strategic stability in South Asia. Pokhran-II tests, comprising five detonations over three days, marked India’s second series of nuclear explosions known as “Operation Shakti,” since its “Smiling Buddha” test in 1974. Yet, an examination of the 1998 tests reveals a complex reality far more nuanced than the official narrative suggests.
India Was Already a Nuclear State — What Did Pokhran-II Prove?
There are various underlying reasons for the Pokhran-II tests. India’s 1974 test, carried out by Indira Gandhi, was conducted under the guise of a peaceful nuclear explosion. It was primarily a proof-of-concept test demonstrating that India possessed basic nuclear technology. However, in May 1998, the Vajpai government overtly and clearly stated a “nuclear weapons test” and declared India a nuclear weapons-capable state.
At the same time, during the mid-1990s, there were efforts going on to finalize the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). These treaties aimed to strengthen global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by banning nuclear tests and restricting the production of fissile materials, respectively.
A critical clause within the CTBT required ratification by 44 specific states, including India, for the treaty to enter into force. There was immense international pressure on India to sign the treaty because the international community was already aware of India’s intent. Before that, India covertly developed nuclear weapons for military purposes under the guise of peaceful nuclear use. Again, before any misadventure, the International community wanted India to sign the CTBT. India’s refusal to sign and its subsequent nuclear tests in 1998 effectively disrupted this consensus framework.
According to an Indian Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, “by conducting the 1998 tests, they had ended ‘nuclear apartheid.’ India’s 1998 nuclear tests symbolized a rejection of the discriminatory international norms. The global nuclear order unfairly privileged certain states by conducting tests, India asserted its strategic autonomy.”
On the domestic front, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leveraged the 1998 nuclear tests as a decisive tool to assert its dominance within India’s nationalist domain. These tests were not merely strategic actions but a central plan of the BJP’s manifesto, which explicitly called for a comprehensive re-evaluation of India’s nuclear policy and the unequivocal decision to induct nuclear weapons. Following nearly a decade of fractured, coalition-led governments, the BJP positioned itself as a powerful new force in national politics, one that embraced a robust and unapologetic stance on possession of nuclear weapons.
Also, the Pokhran-II tests served to elevate Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, a non-Congress leader, as the embodiment of decisive and transformative political leadership that ended years of nuclear indecision and hesitation. As Prime Minister Narendra Modi affirmed in his 11 May 2020 Mann Ki Baat address, “The tests in Pokhran in 1998 also showed the difference a strong political leadership can make.” Unlike the 1974 “Peaceful Nuclear Explosion,” which left India’s nuclear stance shrouded in ambiguity, the 1998 tests decisively shattered the status quo, reflecting a clear political will to cross the nuclear threshold.
Another aim of Indian tests was to demonstrate advanced nuclear weapon capabilities, including thermonuclear (hydrogen bomb) technology. Officially, India claimed a total yield of about 58 kilotons, including a thermonuclear device estimated at 45 kilotons. This demonstration was intended not just as a deterrent but as a statement of India’s technological and military sophistication on the global stage.
However, independent analyses have consistently cast doubt on the claimed yields and the success of the thermonuclear test. There were speculations surrounding the success of the Indian Nuclear test, as most of the independent international observers and even the Indian defense scientist, K. Santhana, publicly described the thermonuclear test as a “fizzle.”
Despite uncertainties about the thermonuclear device’s success, Pokhran-II decisively altered South Asia’s strategic landscape. The tests triggered Pakistan’s nuclear tests just weeks later, initiating an overt nuclearization in the region. Whereas Pakistan is a staunch supporter of arms control in the region. When Pakistan sensed India was on the journey to nuclear weapons, Pakistan proposed the idea of a nuclear-free South Asia. In 1972, it tabled a formal proposal to denuclearize the region, aimed at countering the emerging threat posed by India’s nuclear ambitions.
This initiative was reinforced in 1974 when Pakistan presented another proposal at the United Nations General Assembly, calling for the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in South Asia. From that point onward, Pakistan consistently and sincerely advocated for this cause in every subsequent session of the UN General Assembly. Each year from 1974 to 1997, there were General Assembly resolutions on the establishment of an NWFZ in South Asia.
When voting occurred, Pakistan supported the resolutions, but India rejected them. However, this constructive approach met a turning point when India conducted its second series of nuclear tests on 11 May 1998. Following the Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan ceased to support such zones and adopted a policy of credible deterrence to maintain strategic balance. This implies that, had India not tested in 1998, Pakistan might never have gone nuclear.
Indian nuclear journey is a decades-long covert weapons development, falsely cloaked under the guise of “peaceful nuclear explosions,” exposing a pattern of deception and disregard for international norms. Far from a strategic necessity, the Pokhran-II tests served as political theatrics, allowing the BJP to exploit nuclear brinkmanship to consolidate power through nationalist fervor.
