Is Missile Technology Control Regime in Need of Restructuring?

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an export control cartel developed by likeminded states in 1987. It aims to curb the proliferation of rockets, missiles, unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), and their associated technologies that can carry a payload of not more than 500 Kilograms  (KG) to not more than 300 kilometers (KM) of distance.  Since its formation, the regime has assisted the non-proliferation regime in devising export control norms related to the aforementioned technologies.

MTCR was created by the Group of Seven (G7) industrialized states as a form of political understanding. Right after its development, the Non-Aligned Movement States (NAM) and states aligned with the Soviet Union during the Cold War labelled it as a discriminatory regime that would only serve the security interests of a few industrialized states.  The clearest example of MTCR’s discrimination is India’s membership in the cartel. India, despite being a non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory state, was admitted into MTCR due to Western political lobby, particularly after the India-United States (US) nuclear deal in 2008.

As per its charter,  MTCR  works purely voluntarily and is non-binding in nature. This means that the regime lacks legal enforcement in case any state violates its regulatory mechanisms. This organizational weakness has incentivized some member states to gain access to dual-use technologies, which are later redirected towards the modernization of their missile program. The case of India is particularly concerning prominent as it gained access to advanced guidance and propulsion systems, along with composite materials and navigation technologies from Western suppliers after acquiring membership of  the regime. The same technologies play an important role in modernizing the space-launch vehicles (SLVs) and ballistic missile systems. Simultaneously, the regime’s export control framework has certain loopholes and some of the member states have exploited them for their national interests. India’s development of the extended-range BrahMos cruise missile right after its membership is a case in point. Before India’s MTCR membership, Russia was bound by the regime’s Category-I export restriction list not to transfer missiles, rockets and UAV capable of carrying a 500 kg payload beyond 300 km to India. However, BrahMos’s extended variant, having a range of over 800 km, has successfully turned MTCR membership from a non-proliferation constraint into a strategic enabler to India, as it allowed India to enhance its strike reach under the cover of a regime.  Ironically, during the four-day May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, Delhi used its BrahMos missile against Pakistan. Moreover, recently India also tested a 1500 Km hypersonic cruise missile, and it is reported that it is a further extended variant of BrahMos. Furthermore, an  institutional limitation of the regime lies in its reliance on the consensus based mechanisms for decision making. This requires unanimous agreement among all member states to decide on anything related to the regime. However, consensus is intended to ensure inclusivity, while it often creates a stalemate, sometimes even on petty issues. A single state can delay membership application, block the progress and even stall needed reforms. This procedural limitation has been politicized by the states many times to serve their national interests.  For instance, in 2004, China applied for the MTCR’s full membership, but its application was blocked, primarily due to opposition from the US and several Western member states. Such politicization of the consensus-based forum undermines the effectiveness and universality of the regime. 

Simultaneously, due to the lack of transparency, MTCR is often criticized as a Western exclusive and secretive club. It lacks publicly available rules of procedure, and its decisions and technical updates remain confidential. This opacity not only fuels distrust among non-member states but also opens the doors to selective interpretation of regime guidelines. In 2020, the US unilaterally reinterpreted MTCR’s guidelines to permit UAVs exports. This highlights how a state can interpret the rules to achieve its national interests. Such practices reinforce perceptions of double standards and question the credibility of the MTCR.

Furthermore, the MTCR demonstrates a lack of openness to new members and has no formal criteria for membership, allowing geopolitics to dominate accession decisions. Scholars note that the majority of partners are Western states, creating the perception of a Western centric club that prioritizes their strategic interests. Geopolitical factors can act as both barriers and enablers. China’s membership bid was blocked, while India’s membership was facilitated by favorable political support.

Another structural deficiency of the MTCR is the absence of a permanent secretariat. Unlike the international regimes, it lacks a permanent secretariat and its reliance on a rotating Point of Contact (POC), hosted in Paris, France, responsible for handling the regime’s procedures and arrangements. Furthermore, the  lack of a permanent secretariat can undermine confidence in the implementation of the arrangement, particularly when a non-member has conflicting interests with the POC.  In addition to structural and political barriers, the MTCR faces challenges to the advancement of dual use technology. Emerging technologies like UAVs, hypersonic missiles, and other advanced systems blur the distinction between military and civilian applications. The expert argues that the regime’s outdated control list is insufficient to address the contemporary proliferation concerns.

Therefore, MTCR requires structural and operational reforms to maintain relevance and effectiveness in the contemporary evolving global security landscape. Transparency may be enhanced through policy, available rules of procedure, regular updates and a best practice sharing culture to address the perceptions of double standards. Membership and decision-making processes may be reformed with clear accession criteria to facilitate border participation and to minimize the politicization. Establishing a dedicated secretariat would ensure institutional continuity, effective coordination of member activities and impartial administration.  The regime must explicitly address emerging technologies, including advanced UAVs, hypersonic missiles, and dual use systems, through technical workshops and knowledge sharing initiatives. Additionally, aligning the MTCR with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, the Hague Code of Code, and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCCW) would reinforce legitimacy and strengthen the global non-proliferation regimes. All these restructuring reforms would strengthen the regime’s overall effectiveness and credibility as well. Till this happens, the credibility and universal acceptance of MTCR should be severely lacking.