The new cold war between the U.S, Russia, and China has divided the world into East and West. Russia and China assumed their positions as a worldwide threat to the US-led regime. China is more assertive in economics, politics, and nuclear issues. China wants an autonomous and equal share of global dominance like the US and Russia. China’s inspiration to equally govern economic and strategic affairs arises from the recurrence of the old Cold War, which divided the world into two blocs: Eagle vs. Dragon-Bear.
Consistent geopolitical tensions between the US and China and the US strategic policies, such as the National Security Strategy 2022, National Defense Strategy 2022, and the Indo-Pacific Strategy 2022, limit the scale of bilateral and multilateral credible arms control agreements with China. These strategies create more complexity and uncertainty in the US deterrence postures, causing regional instability. Moreover, these policies are more aggressive than defensive in limiting China’s growing nuclear arsenal.
The other nuclear flash point and major driver behind the arms race is the China Relations Act. The US is Taiwan’s biggest military aid provider, providing about $50 billion in defense equipment and services since the 1950s. The US has supplied numerous pieces of equipment, including F-16 fighter jets, Patriot missile systems, and naval vessels.
Additionally, it has included the sale of advanced weaponry such as the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAM), High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), and Harpoon anti-ship missiles. China views these additions as escalators because they enhance Taiwan’s defensive capabilities.
The US policy of strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan and its miscalculation of conflicts, such as the Davidson window, is exacerbating the sharp arms race and both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear and conventional arsenals. The US accounted for approximately 40% of global arms exports, whereas China accounted for approximately 5–6%. China aims to achieve equal partnership and generate revenue in international arms sales. Thus, the policies on both sides drive the arms race globally, requiring credible certainty in national policies and separate geopolitical and economic differences to divert the arms race.
China’s arms control efforts and achievements:
China’s arms control policy relies on three principles. First, it does not allow any regime or agreement to undermine its minimal security needs with changing global patterns. Second, it believes arms control agreements should be intergovernmental, based on greater transparency, responsibility, and symmetric measures worldwide.
Third, it is reluctant to interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries and their security needs. Thus, these elements hinder it from consistently participating in arms control globally.
China is consistent in its arms control policies, yet it is not under the obligations of any arms control agreement. China is a recognized nuclear state under the NPT and has signed and ratified the obligations and regulations under NPT safeguards. It is maintaining its least nuclear deterrent posture and a no-first-use policy while focusing on the civilian use of nuclear technology. It is the world’s fastest-growing nuclear commercial reactor state, comprising 50 civilian nuclear reactors.
Moreover, China has ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. It has collaborated with P-5 states and the IAEA to enhance the physical protection of nuclear material while preventing nuclear theft. In the CTBT, even having numerous issues with the US on the ratification principles, China has supported the notion of the CTBT installing international monitoring stations and conducting nuclear tests 45 times, compared to Russia, 715 times, and the US, 1,035 times since 1996.
It has advocated the objectives on many forums and raised concerns about the discriminatory nature of the treaty. According to China, the FMCT should allow all the nuclear weapons states to produce the minimum fissile material required to sustain their security needs and eliminate nuclear asymmetries.
China has maintained its compliance with the NPT and signed an agreement in 2010 to convert small miniature source neutron reactors (MSNRs) from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium with the compliance of IAEA safeguards. All the domestic and exported miniature source reactors have remained under the IAEA safeguards, and global threat reduction initiatives have converted 10 MNSRs worldwide from HEU to LEU.
China has also been a vibrant actor in denuclearizing the Korean peninsula and facilitated peaceful negotiations under the six-party talks and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It plays a lively role in the P5 dialogues and manages to secure negative security assurances, NFU, establish confidence-building measures, and put risk reduction measures in place.
China is building its nuclear arsenal due to regional security issues and geopolitical competition with the United States. China is consistent with its minimum deterrence posture. This is the core concept behind its military build-up. It aims to keep its nuclear deterrence credible. The size of nuclear arsenals and inventories depends on the availability and production of fissile materials such as HEU, tritium, and plutonium.
It contains approximately 14 tons of HEU and 2.9 tons of separated plutonium. It is enough to double the size of nuclear arsenals by about 1000 by 2030, yet it would require additional fissile material to grow the size of nuclear arsenals. The additional fissile material would come from a military-civilian fusion strategy.
There is uncertainty about the Chinese nuclear warheads. Experts estimate that it possesses 440 operational warheads. Still, the DF-26 series and the inventory of the 320 missile silos indicate that it is currently producing more nuclear warheads and has an uncertain number of atomic arsenals under production. China is focusing on vertical proliferation by introducing new variants of land-based ballistic missiles, including an increase from 18 to 48 DF-5 silos, 24 DF-31 variants, DF-41 with MIRV capabilities, an expansion of the DF-26 series to 72 launchers, and an increase in the DF-21 series from 42 to 94. Most of these missiles can also serve dual purposes to counter the situation.
China is also modernizing its submarines and sea-based ballistic missiles. It currently possesses second-generation 6 Jin-class SSBNs (type 094) and 6 Shang-class SSNs (type 093), JL-2 SLBM, and JL-3 SLBM. China is producing a new generation of submarines, like the Type 096. They would likely carry the JL-3 SLBM to target Washington, DC, giving them strategic depth. It has made significant progress in developing conventional and nuclear-armed hypersonic missiles.
It operates dual-use technologies such as wind tunnel testing facilities and fractional orbital bombardment systems. It has also developed hypersonic glide vehicles like DF-ZF and Starry Sky-2, which can carry conventional and nuclear warheads.
Controlling the uncontrolled arms race:
China recently revoked any arms control negotiations, geopolitical tensions such as the Russia-Ukraine war, and consistent policies to sell arms to Taiwan. Arms control discussions should remain distinct from other security matters. For instance, during the implementation of the CTBTO verification process, both China and the US were ambivalent, but China finally agreed to sign the treaty.
The U.S. should address Chinese concerns about advanced U.S. missile defense systems like the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA, which could undermine its retaliatory capabilities. The U.S. and China should conduct joint technical studies and publish declassified findings on nukes. In return, China could increase transparency about its nuclear arsenal.
The U.S. and China could explore the overlap between space and nuclear concerns through a joint moratorium on debris-generating anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, providing transparency on space-based technologies. China could also adopt a moratorium on fissile material production.
Due to geopolitical rivalry, controlled arms racing is the pragmatic approach to bringing China into a concrete arms control process. Thus, both nations could explore an agreement limiting launchers for missiles, submarines, and bombers, regardless of their armament. This approach balances regional and strategic capabilities and could involve only the P5 states rather than Russia.
The US must promote China’s involvement in informal arms control initiatives, such as the International Partnership for Disarmament Verification, to build experience and trust through technical discussions. The US must adhere to non-intervention policies in the Taiwan Strait and explore economic avenues that benefit both parties.
Taiwan is a nuclear flashpoint that has gained significant importance in the aftermath of the Russia-Ukraine war. The U.S. must revisit its Taiwan policy to restore its diplomatic credibility with China and foster regional stability and arms control negotiations. [i]China perceives strategic ambiguity in the US missile and forces deployment in its neighborhood. The US should invite Chinese experts to observe mock inspections and share lessons from US-Russia agreements.
Conclusion:
The geopolitical rivalries between the US and China have stiffened arms racing worldwide. The US supports its allies, such as India, to counter China’s growing influence worldwide, while China also wants equality in global affairs, as Russia did during the Cold War. In the multilateral world order, bilateral arms control is not the safest way.
The U.S needs to reconsider its policies, particularly Taiwan’s policy towards China, and engage international forums to address Chinese security concerns. Though arms control is challenging to achieve in this uncertain circumstance, arms racing in a controlled manner is a possible way to limit the number of nuclear arsenals of China and slow down the nuclear fissile material production facilities.
