Do the Missile CBMs between Pakistan and India need to be Revisited?
In March 2022, India inadvertently fired a supersonic BrahMos missile in Pakistan’s eastern city of Mian Channu from Suratgarh. The Indian authorities claimed that the incident was an “accidental fire due to technical malfunction.” Islamabad reiterated its concerns about the irresponsible firing of missiles by stating that it has “grave concerns for the regional peace and stability,” and demanded a joint probe. Whether intentional or inadvertent, this incident could have been perceived as a strategic signalling by India and potential to flare up tensions between Pakistan and India. . The following article explores the limitations of the existing India-Pakistan agreement on the Pre-notification of Flight Tests of Ballistic Missiles and lays out policy recommendations for ensuring South Asian strategic stability.
In 2005, India and Pakistan signed an agreement on the Pre-notification of Flight Tests of Ballistic Missiles. Under this agreement, both parties pledged to provide Notice for Air Mission (NOTAMs) and Navigational Area (NAVAREAs) of the ballistic missile test 3 days before the testing, through respecive Foreign Offices and High Commissions. The rudimentary objectives of the agreement are to reduce the risk of miscalculation and develop transparency to minimize misunderstanding and promote regional peace and stability.
However, there are some limitations of this agreement, and these limitations could impact the peace and stability of the region if not addressed timely. First and foremost, this agreement does not deal with cruise missiles, miniature missiles, supersonic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and hypersonic cruise missiles. Secondly, the development and deployment of advanced technologies have rendered the 72-hour window less relevant in today’s high-stakes security environment. Third, the agreement does not entail any standard operating procedures (SOP) regarding any accidental/unintentional/unauthorized launch of a missile. The agreement only deals with notifications of the testing through Foreign Officers and High Commissions, for maintaining communication and transparency. However, during times of crisis, there is no direct line of communication where the accidental/unauthorized launch of a missile by one party could be communicated in a timely and effective manner to the other party.
Despite its limitations, this agreement serves as a successful example of bilateral cooperation between two nuclear-armed neighbours. In the absence of an arms control agreement and a crisis management mechanism, such CBMs are considered valuable. While their actual values don’t lie in their existence, but in their relevance and adaptability. To strengthen the South Asian strategic stability, both states must take some measures to keep this agreement relevant in the age of advanced missile technology. These measures can be incorporated into the agreement through amendments in the agreement under Article 8.
Most importantly, both states can expand the scope of the agreement, along with the ballistic missile and advanced missile technology, including miniature missiles, supersonic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which need to be added to the agreement. New Delhi has already tested a BrahMos, a supersonic cruise missile and a Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV), which need to be incorporated into the agreement for effective risk reduction. Secondly, in the era of disruptive military technologies, there exists a dire need for establishing a real-time crisis management mechanism to respond to the accidental/unauthorized launches or technical malfunctions, as evident from the 2022 BrahMos incident. This could be the direct military-military hotline or a joint data-sharing center for real-time communication. Third, both states can set SOPs for unintended missile launches. The agreement also should include a clearly defined SOP for technical malfunctions, accidental or unauthorized launches, so that accidental fire is not perceived as an attack. Moreover, Pakistan and India may have to establish a verification and compliance mechanism to address the unauthorized or accidental launch of the missile.
However, critics argue that the BJP’s political aspiration and New Delhi’s history of irresponsible behavior towards regional peace and stability make such cooperation unlikely. Like in the case of so called inadvertent fire of BrahMos, India failed to immediately inform Islamabad and was unable to provide a transparent explanation, which reflects its irresponsible behavior. Such behavior undermines existing CBMs and raises doubts about India’s willingness to engage in constructive risk-reduction efforts. If Pakistan and India show the political will to revive this CBM in line with present-day challenges, it will not only enhance stability but also set a useful, precedent for regional rivalries across the world.
The pre-notification of the flight test of a ballistic missile has been considered a milestone in South Asian strategic stability, but faces challenges with the advancement of missile technologies. The 2022 incident of BrahMos highlights its inability to address the crisis situation and challenges of advanced missile technology. Without addressing the limitations of the agreement, South Asia will remain vulnerable to unintended escalation and miscalculations.
