“A world without nuclear weapons is not only possible, but it is essential.”
(Ex-President of the United States of America Barak Obama)
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) added a new spirit to the existing discourse on nuclear disarmament as it proposed the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The treaty explicitly states that signatories are barred from engaging in developing, testing, producing, manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, and stockpiling nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, Article IV of the treaty aimed for complete nuclear disarmament. However, not a single nuclear weapon state was involved in the drafting of the arrangement and even not signed the treaty. The following analysis highlights how TPNW, despite being a moral milestone, lacks a substantial framework for nuclear disarmament and recommends steps to induce new spirit into the treaty in the changing geopolitical dynamics.
Though the effort to eliminate the nuclear arsenals begins at the dawn of the atomic age. However, the negotiations for the TPNW were followed by humanitarian concerns, majorly by the NPT Non-Nuclear Weapons State (NNWS) after the Cold War. The movement gained substantial momentum at the 2014 Vienna Conference titled “Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons”. After extensive negotiations On July 7, 2017, the TPNW was adopted by a vote of 122 countries in favor. This treaty is the first legally binding international agreement to comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons. Currently, TPNW has 93 signatories’ states and 70 actively participating states.
In the contemporary geo-political environment, when major arms control agreements are ineffective and trust deficit among major nuclear weapon states is continuously growing. The nuclear weapon states are continuously increasing their nuclear weapons stockpile. According to the July 2024 report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the global nuclear arsenal consists of 12,121 warheads. Of these, approximately 3,904 are actively deployed and are ready for use. The vast majority of these warheads belong to the United States and Russia. Alarmingly, this combined global stockpile has the capacity to unleash destruction equivalent to about 135,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs.
Despite the growing number of signatories, member states still believe that the TPNW has successfully mobilized civil society and shaped public opinion by emphasizing humanitarian concerns, thereby strengthening anti-nuclear norms. While, this has led to criticism that the TPNW is merely a moral gesture rather than a substantive step toward nuclear disarmament. The fundamental issue lies in the fact that no state possessing nuclear weapons has signed the treaty, and ironically, neither participated in its drafting process. This raises a critical question: how can nuclear weapons be eliminated if those who possess them are not even part of the treaty framework?
Proponents of TPNW argue that as the number of signatories increases, the treaty may evolve into customary international law. However, this notion is somewhat utopian, as states can invoke the persistent objector rule based on their consent. Consequently, customary international law cannot be applied to states that object from the outset.
Furthermore, TPNW is highly focused on humanitarian consequences, which provides a moral appeal rather than a concrete obligation for eliminating nuclear weapons. When it comes to state behaviour, morality does not work, rather a legal and obligatory framework with incentives and punishment would be of great deal.
Also, TPNW lacks adequate verification regime to ensure compliance and build trust among the nations. Without a verification mechanism it is not possible for the treaty to produce desirable outcomes. Also, the ongoing conflict, like Russia-Ukraine, are making nuclear disarmament more difficult. Countries like Ukraine are reviewing their decision to give up the nuclear weapons. In such circumstances it would be difficult for regimes like TPNW to achieve its objectives.
In the contemporary era with evolving geopolitical and changing geostrategic dynamics there is a pressing need to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. TPNW, being a strong pillar of disarmament, needed to be revived with some substantial changes. And being the champions of non-proliferation, the responsibility lies on the NPT Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). To ensure nuclear disarmament, NPT NWS must become part of TPNW. Once they become a member then non-NPT NWS and NPT NNWS could be brought into the treaty.
Second, to ensure compliance and verification, the treaty must establish a robust verification regime. For verification mechanisms, TPNW regime could engage with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, when it comes to nuclear disarmament, IAEA has its own limitations. Thus, devising a separate regime for verification supports the TPNW to eliminate nuclear weapons from the world.
TPNW can also be linked with other disarmament related arrangements supported by the United Nations (UN) to produce a cohesive approach for global security. Lastly, fostering dialogue and confidence-building measures among NWS states can help reduce tensions and pave the way for disarmament discussions. Initiatives such as joint security exercises, track-two diplomacy, and third-party mediation can create opportunities for dialogue and will reduce the increasing trust deficit among states. This would not just address the growing incompatibility among states, rather it will pave a way for disarmament.
